Policy Research Working Paper 6221
China's government economic stimulus package in 2008-09 appears to have worked well. It seems to have been about the right size, included a number of appropriate components, and was well timed. Its subnational component was designed to maximize the impact of the stimulus package on the economy and minimize the potential procyclical elements that are usually built into subnational fiscal mechanisms in federal countries. Moreover, China's massive fiscal stimulus played an important role in the overall recovery of the global economy. Using a simple analytical framework, this paper focuses on two key factors behind the success of the stimulus: investments in bottleneck-easing infrastructure projects and countercyclical nature of subnational spending based on the assumption that well-chosen infrastructure projects could improve business climate and thereby crowd in the private investment. The paper This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sfardoust1@gmail.com and xluo@worldbank.org.
concludes that the expansionary subnational government spending played a key role in strengthening the overall impact of the stimulus and sustaining growth. It also highlights the importance of public investment quality and cautions about the sustainability of local government financing through the domestic banking system and increases in local governments off balance sheet or contingent liabilities. These lessons may be of particular relevance today for China, as well as other countries, in formulating policy response to another global economic slowdown or crisis, possibly as a result of the Eurozone turmoil. For China, investing in urban infrastructure and green economy, as well as in higher quality and better targeted social services, will be crucial for improving income inequality and inducing a more inclusive growth path.
Introduction
In 2008-09 the world economy experienced the sharpest downturn since the Great Depression.
The annual pace of world GDP growth fell from 5. As a result of a coordinated policy response by the world's largest economies, the global economy seemed to be on a path to recovery in 2010. The recovery has been weak and fragile, however, with global growth slowing from more than 5 percent in 2010 to about 3.5 percent in 2011. Growth in the advanced economies slowed to just 1.5 percent in 2011 and is expected to decelerate further in 2012.
In contrast, growth in emerging and developing economies remained above 6 percent, though it is expected to decelerate in 2012, supporting global growth. These economies accounted for 60- The focus of this paper is China's fiscal policy response, which prevented a recession in China and played an important role in the overall recovery of emerging and developing economies since 2008-09. The paper also analyzes China's subnational fiscal response in support of its overall policy response.
China's economy has continued to expand rapidly until mid-2012, driven to a large extent by the development of the private sector. Exports were hit hard by the global crisis, slowing activity sharply during 2008. However, a rapid and sizable countercyclical policy response, as well as quick adjustment in the labor market, helped accelerate growth in 2009, positioning China to play a leading role in the global recovery.
In contrast to what happened in many countries where government stimulus spending crowded out private investment and consumption and the central government's expansionary fiscal policy was mostly offset by the procyclical contraction of expenditure at the subnational levels, China's stimulus generated large multiplier effects on overall output, in part by creating additional demand by encouraging private investment and consumption. The stimulus had significant effects on output at both the national and subnational level, through strong countercyclical subnational expansionary spending that matched the earmarked funds from the center. However, local governments' investments were largely financed from bank borrowing, which may have led to a sharp rise in the local governments' indebtedness and off balance sheet contingent liabilities. This paper describes China's fiscal stimulus and draws lessons for effective stimuli in China and other large federal countries. Using a simple analytical framework, it focuses on investments in bottleneck-easing infrastructure projects and the countercyclical nature of subnational spending as among the key factors behind the success of the stimulus.
The stimulus package prevented a major deceleration in growth, but concerns remain about its sustainability and the quality of some of its investments. Prudent management of resource 4 allocation, project selection, and local government finance are crucial for the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of some of the underlying national and state-level projects. The analysis draws some lessons from China's experience-for China and for other countries, both developed and developing. These lessons may be of particular relevance today, as the global economy appears to be on the precipice of another recession as a result of the ramifications of the debt crisis in Europe. The possibility of a sharp rise in oil prices as a result of geopolitical events in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East also looms on the immediate horizon.
All of these events are likely to reduce the fiscal space (because of lower economic growth and automatic stabilizers) for a sizable fiscal stimulus in many countries. Policy makers must thus carefully assess their experience with the first round of countercyclical policies in response to the global crisis and draw lessons to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness in future efforts they may launch in response to another regional or global crisis. Given China's strong economic fundamentals, the government was able to speedily implement a sizable stimulus package. In the face of the precipitous drop in exports in the second half of 2008, Chinese authorities used both fiscal and monetary policies to maintain growth. On the monetary side, they cut both the reserve ratio and policy interest rates and removed a number of restraints on domestic bank lending. A gradual appreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar, in both real and nominal terms, alleviated some of the inflationary pressures caused by the sizable policy stimulus. 1 On the fiscal side, the initial low public debt level and a large government budget surplus provided the government with the fiscal space to introduce a massive stimulus package.
China's Response to the Global Crisis
Quantifying the total additional fiscal stimulus is difficult, because some outlays and tax reductions were already programmed before the onset of the global recession, but its scale clearly dwarfed fiscal responses in the advanced economies.
A substantial portion of the stimulus package of 2008-09 was in the form of extra outlays on infrastructure, particularly in the transport and energy subsectors. Some new spending was also allocated to social programs, particularly in health care, and environmental projects, which are viewed as important ingredients for achieving sustainable and inclusive growth in the medium to long term. The central government has been funding part of the measures in the stimulus package.
Local governments, as well as state-owned enterprises and banks, have been financing the rest. 
Effects of China's Fiscal Stimulus
China's fiscal stimulus helped prevent a drastic slowdown of its economy, which had been growing by double digits for three decades. Had the economy suddenly slowed significantly, latent issues could have surfaced, such as a sharp increase in unemployment which would have Calculating the net fiscal multiplier is difficult, because there is no simple way to control the "fiscal experiment" (Barro and Redlick 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009) . The consensus in the literature is that fiscal expansion through higher spending has larger multiplier effects than expansion via a tax cut. In the short term, an increase in government capital spending has larger multiplier effects than untargeted increases in government expenditure (Ducanes and others 2006) .
Estimates of the fiscal multipliers depend on the methodology, period, initial conditions, and controls applied. Models that assume full employment, rational expectations, and some version of Ricardian equivalence are more likely to have near zero or negative fiscal multipliers.
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The size of the multiplier tends to be larger when leakages are minimized, monetary conditions are accommodative, and the country's fiscal position is favorable. In the United States in the past 20 years, multipliers on government spending are estimated to have been between 1.5 to 2.0. Tax cut multipliers, estimated to be between 0.5 to 1 0 (Nallari 2010), are much smaller, because a large share of the tax reduction is often saved rather than spent. In the United States, the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income in the past three decades averaged around 0.70, whereas the marginal propensity to consume out of reduction in taxes and tax rebates was only about 0.13 (Feldstein 2009 ). When separating revenue changes resulting from legislation from other changes, such as those related to changes in prospective economic conditions, it is estimated that a tax cut equivalent to 1 percent of US GDP raises output by about 1 percent within a year, but the magnitude rises in the following periods and reach about 3 percent after three years (Romer and Romer, 2010) . A survey of empirical evidence suggests that for the 2008-9 stimuli by the G20, the low set of multipliers was 0.3 for revenue, 0.5 for capital spending, and 0.3 for other spending; the high set of multipliers was 0.6 for revenue, 1.8
for capital spending, and 1.0 for other spending (Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler 2009 ).
For a sample of 102 developing countries, the one-year government spending multiplier resulting from borrowing from official creditors is estimated to be around 0.4 (Kraay, 2012) . Since 1980
1950-2006
Government spending: 1.5-2
Tax-cut: 0.5-1
Tax-reduction and tax-rebate: 0.13 1% within a year, and up to 3% after three years
Nallari (2010) Feldstein ( Schindler (2009) Kraay (2012) Source: Authors' compilation.
Whether developing or advanced economies have larger multipliers depends on several factors.
On the one hand, multipliers may be larger in developed countries because they are better able than developing countries to maintain increased government consumption. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2011) On the other hand, the potentially higher marginal economic returns to public investment in human capital and infrastructure in developing countries suggest larger multipliers for public sector spending in developing countries. In emerging markets, where fiscal space is large, the safety net shallow, and infrastructure deficits great, the effects of fiscal policy are greater than in advanced economies (Aizeman and Jinjarak 2010).
Why Did China's Stimulus Succeed?
The success of China's fiscal stimulus package suggests that government intervention can bear fruit, in particular in a developing country in which fiscal expenditure is usually procyclical and of limited effect. China's strong fiscal position and vast foreign exchange reserves supported the swift implementation of the massive countercyclical intervention. A simplified analytical framework helps explain the success of China's stimulus. A simple equation captures the various components of domestic production:
where Y stands for output, C for consumption, I for investment, G for government spending, and X -M for net export (exports of goods and services minus imports of goods and services). The lower case variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) represent investment (i), consumption (c), and net exports (h) as functions of government spending G.
Government spending (G) is the sum of central government spending ( 1 )and total spending by subnational governments ( 2 ) . 4 Total spending by subnational governments equals ∑ j , where j stands for the expenditure of subnational government j, which is a function of a vector of factors, including subnational output, horizontal and vertical transfers, and idiosyncratic characteristics:
Two factors contributed to the unusually large multiplier effect of China's fiscal stimulus (dy/dg):
(a) the large marginal effects of government spending on investment (i'), consumption (c'), and in medium to long run on net exports (h') and (b) the strong countercyclical nature of subnational government expenditures (as reflected by a magnifying power of f', the marginal effect of an increase in aggregate subnational spending on national output), assuming no significant changes in taxation and fully accommodating monetary policy:
Large Marginal Effects of Government Expenditure
Investment-centered stimulus programs tend to have larger multiplier effects than incomecentered tax incentives. The marginal effect of investment (i') in China has been large.
The stimulus package focused on 10 main areas, including low-income housing, rural infrastructure, water, electricity, transportation, the environment, technological innovation, and rebuilding from several disasters. Infrastructure made up some three-quarters of the stimulus package. The well-chosen infrastructure investments not only finance themselves, refuting the Ricardian Equivalence in the long-run, they also improve the overall investment climate by unclogging bottlenecks and crowding in private investment. 
Strong Countercyclical Nature of Subnational Government Expenditure
The strong countercyclical subnational government spending in China resulted in exceptionally large fiscal multipliers. This pattern of spending is in contrast to procyclical government expenditures at the subnational levels in most countries.
As in many countries, subnational governments in China are the major public sector employers, responsible for the delivery of most public services. More than 80 percent of total government expenditure is carried out by subnational governments. is a unitary state, even though in several important ways it behaves as a fiscal federalism and its fiscal system shares some of the key features of fiscal systems in federal countries (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003) . In particular, fiscal decentralization has been a fundamental aspect of China's transition to a market economy, and the country has made substantial progress in moving away from its highly centralized fiscal management system and tax sharing system, though the current fiscal system requires further reforms, particularly in the areas of sub-provincial expenditure assignment, dealing with widening fiscal disparities and intergovernmental transfer system (Shen, Jin and Zou 2012).
Quasi-conventional wisdom holds that at the central government level, fiscal policies are acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries (Arreaza, Sorensen, and Yosha 1999; Seitz 2000; Talvi and Vegh 2000) . In general, government spending in developing countries closely follows-and hence reinforces-the business cycle, because of imperfections in international credit markets that prevent developing countries from borrowing in bad times and the political economy of the strong incentive to pursue expansionary fiscal policy in good times (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004; Talvi and Vegh 2005) . Using a quarterly data set on 49 countries for the period 1960 -2006 , Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008 document the procyclicality of government spending, establishing a causal relation between output and government consumption in developing countries.
The revenues of subnational governments are strongly procyclical in most advanced economies and developing countries (box 2). Countries whose subnational governments are most constrained by the basic fiscal contract to rely on an inflexible income-elastic tax base often display greater procyclicality (Rodden and Wibbels 2010) .The decline in local own-source revenues is often exacerbated by cuts in tax revenues shared with the central government.
Stimulus transfers from the central government often fail to fully offset the procyclicality of subnational fiscal position (IMF 2012b). As a result, in the absence of substantial borrowing or 15 draw-downs of rainy day funds, subnational expenditures are often procyclical. As delivery of key public services is the responsibility of subnational governments, their procyclical pattern of spending can be especially difficult for the most vulnerable citizens, whose need for social services increases in downturns. As expenditures are more decentralized than revenues in many countries, most subnational governments rely on intergovernmental transfers or revenue sharing as an important part of their revenue (Eyraud and Lusinyan 2011) . In China, where responsibilities for public services are largely decentralized, the procyclical nature of subnational government expenditure has played a key role in stimulating growth during the post 2008-09 crisis.
Box 2 Procyclicality of subnational government revenue
Subnational governments' own-source revenues are procyclical in most federal countries . The extent to which they are procyclical depends on three features: the income elasticity of provincial revenue sources, the role of the central government in stabilizing regional finances through intergovernmental grants and revenue-sharing schemes, and subnational access to credit markets.
Balanced budget requirements in many countries, such as the United States, lead to substantial procyclicality in subnational government spending, with the stringency of a state's rules driving the pace at which it must adjust to shocks (Clemens and Miran 2012; Jonas, 2012) .
Several factors affect the procyclicality of subnational government revenue. First, the income elasticity of the tax base varies across economies. In the United States, subnational governments have depended for decades on income and sales taxes for own-source revenue, which closely follow the business cycle (Sorensen and Yosha 2001) . In contrast, in Germany, most taxes are shared across levels; Länder (states) have limited "own" taxes, mainly the motor vehicle tax, normally faces substantially lower interest rate to finance its deficit, to shoulder the full burden of the borrowing and making countercyclical fiscal transfers to states and local governments (Gozalez et al, 2002) .
Source: Review of literature by the authors.
In the past two decades, China's fiscal policy has been largely countercyclical. When economic growth decelerated, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP increased at a faster rate (figure Another reason is related to the decentralized authoritarian system in China, in which the central government has concentrated personnel controls over subnational governments (Xu 2008) .
Subnational government officials, who control the bulk of the Chinese economy, have strong incentives to follow closely the policy directions of the central government. earlier, but the increase only offset a collapse in credit in other parts of the economy. Large grants to the states did not result in an increase in government purchases at the state and local levels. Payments that temporarily increased disposable income did not significantly affect consumption expenditure (Taylor 2011) .
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In the European Union, expenditures in multitiered fiscal systems are often procyclical. Although national automatic stabilizers may help smooth taxes, consumption, and output over the business cycle, the Stability and Growth Pact, which limits independent borrowing by subnational government, pulls subnational fiscal policy in the opposite direction. Comparative empirical research emphasizes the role of national tax transfer systems in cushioning asymmetric regional shocks, but little is known about the cyclicality of subnational fiscal policy.
In China, the tax reforms of 1994, which strengthened the central government's fiscal capacity, played a key role in laying the ground for a stimulus package during a crisis. The reforms gradually increased the share of total government revenue to GDP and the share of central government revenue to total government revenue (box 3).
Box 3 Tax reforms in China
From 1980 to 1993, China adopted the fiscal contracting system, which decentralized tax administration. Subnational governments had strong incentives to retain fiscal revenues and develop their localities by imposing the lowest taxes possible on enterprises. As a result, the ratio of total government revenue to GDP declined, as did central government revenues relative to total government revenues. The 1994 tax reform replaced the discretion-based revenue-sharing system with a more rule-based fiscal assignment system, allowing the central authorities to reassert themselves more actively and to use fiscal policy for redistribution (Dollar and Hofman 2008) . 
Lessons Learned
China's stimulus package appears to have worked exceptionally well. It was about the right size, included the appropriate components, and was well timed. Its subnational component was designed to maximize the impact of the stimulus package on the economy and minimize the potential procyclical elements that are usually built into subnational fiscal mechanisms in large federal countries. If well managed, an infrastructure investment-focused plan could once again generate large multipliers in the short run and increase production capacity and the rate of growth of productivity in the long run. Going forward, emphasizing rural infrastructure, as well as urban infrastructure to facilitate sustainable urbanization, which had been impeded due to the strategy of prioritizing heavy industries, to support investment and consumption remains crucial for the rebalancing of the economy (Lin 2012) . Due to the rapid urbanization since the 1980s, there is a large gap in the provision of basic infrastructure in urban areas and massive investments are required (World Bank 2012). These investments can continue to finance themselves, thus nullifying the Ricardian equivalence-type effects and avoiding the tax today or tax later dilemma.
The success of China's fiscal stimulus offers several useful lessons for both advanced and emerging economies.
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Multipliers Are Larger When Debt Is Lower
The high level of government debt severely reduces the effect of stimulus in many advanced and some emerging economies through its large negative effects on growth. The strong fiscal stance and low level of debt on the eve of the global crisis gave China plenty of scope for decisive action. Fiscal multipliers are larger when the debt to GDP ratio is lower or the fiscal space larger.
An IMF estimate suggests that a 10 percent increase in public debt is associated with an annual decline of 0.2-0.3 in per capita GDP growth (Kumar and Woo 2010) . Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) posit that GDP growth will be 2 percentage points lower when external debt to GDP is 60 percent or higher and that economic growth rate could be cut by half if public debt reaches a 
Targeting and the Quality of Spending Matter
How the stimulus is targeted (on infrastructure or social safety net programs, for example) and the quality of spending determine the impact and fiscal sustainability of the stimulus. There is less pressing need for infrastructure investment in advanced economies than in emerging and developing economies. But demand exists for certain categories of infrastructure, including upgrades of ailing transport and communications systems and new investments in green infrastructure. Many of these investments are the responsibilities of subnational governments.
Providing appropriate incentives to subnational governments on targeted infrastructure investment can be an effective way to boost expenditure at the subnational level, counteracting the procyclical nature of such spending and increasing productivity growth in the long run.
There are massive needs for infrastructure investments in many developing, particularly in Africa. By finding innovative ways to finance these investment needs, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), particularly the rapidly growing ones held by emerging and high-income (mainly oil exporters) countries, and pension funds could be leveraged to finance infrastructure investments in emerging and developing countries. This mode of financing infrastructure investments would 24 be an effective way to channel funds from low return investments to higher return investments and thereby contribute to global growth, employment generation, and ultimately social and political stability in poorer countries (Lin 2011b ).
The Need to Stimulate the Economy Should Not Drive Investment
Infrastructure investments may not be as productive as hoped for if they are driven mainly by short-term countercyclical considerations or politically motivated incentives. They are best driven by a sound public investment management system, in which the selection and implementation of projects are based on value for money. Ensuring the quality of investment takes time. The dash for shovel-ready projects can undermine the selection process. When projects are prepared in a rush, the incidence of corruption and mismanagement can rise and the quality and value for money of projects can decline. Countries in which governments at both the central and subnational levels have a list of good quality projects are more likely to witness better stimulus effects. 6 The local governments sponsor the issuance of corporate debt, some of which are even qualified as paid-in capital. . This increased leverage, however, could have a strong negative effect on growth if the returns on the investments fall significantly below expectation.
Future stimulus should be executed mainly through the budget rather than the banking system.
Given the massive needs for infrastructure investment at the provincial and municipal levels in China, the current system would need to be reformed to allow local governments to borrow and issue bonds, which would be a an efficient way to bring off budget borrowing on budget and help manage the risks emanating from local government borrowing and Urban Development Investment Corporation debts. However, the decision to allow local governments to borrow should be based on proper incentives for local governments to comply with the rules, developing a comprehensive and transparent information system on their activities, and instituting appropriate sanctions if they breach pre-agreed quantitative and qualitative criteria.
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Lending and Investment Must Be Economically Justified
Lending from state-owned banks and investment by state-owned enterprises are driven mainly by the policy directives of the central and local governments; in-depth economic underpinning may be lacking, in particular when decisions are made in haste.
Investment by state-owned enterprises included highly leveraged purchases of real estate. The sharp increase in demand raised real estate prices and may not be sustainable. Residential land auction prices in eight major cities doubled in 2009, controlling for quality variation (Deng and others 2011) . When the bubble bursts, the state-owned enterprises-and hence the state-owned banks-will suffer in multiple ways. It is hence more prudent to rely mainly on fiscal measures than on monetary expansion should another round of stimulus be required, even though the size of the resulting multiplier would be smaller.
Prudent management of infrastructure project selection, local government finance, and macro resource allocation is crucial for a stimulus to be sustainable and effective in the long term. The strong leverage effect of the central government stimulus on subnational government spending could magnify both the positive and negative effects, particularly as a large share of the money was financed through government-backed bonds. If projects are not well chosen, stimulus investment can only postpone the needed adjustment and result in a spiral that leads to more unneeded investment to absorb the unnecessary supply. Such investments will add to unutilized capacity, which will exacerbate inflation and increase local government debt and to a lower growth. When the incentives to invest are strong, the "fever of investment" can be harmful, as it was in the 1990s.
The Risks Arising from Worsening Income Distribution and Environmental Problems
The decline in external demand in China has been largely compensated for by increases in domestic investment. The evidence so far indicate that household consumption as a share of GDP has continued to decline (Figure 4) , though it is possible that the stimulus prevented a potential decline in the level of private consumption. In fact, growth of household consumption (in terms of US dollars) in 2011 has been relatively large compared with other emerging and 26 with advanced economies (Barnet et al 2012) . Nevertheless, improving China's income distribution and inclusiveness of its economy, as well as reforming of its banking system and intergovernmental fiscal system, are critical for substantially stimulating private consumption and growth of domestic effective demand and thereby rebalancing GDP growth over the medium-to long-term. A sudden shift from investment to consumption as the main source of stimulus can add to inflationary pressures, lower output growth, and lead to higher unemployment in the short-run, as it would take time for industries to shift their products away from exports and capital goods towards domestic demand and consumption goods while maintaining high employment. Therefore, to continue filling the gap in industrial upgrading and to provide a more conducive business environment for productivity growth, increased investments in high priority infrastructure areas is critical. Given China's emphasis on green development, it will need to make massive investments in clean and more efficient energy and in the urban areas, including urban infrastructure in order to improve urban living and reduce urban congestion and sprawl (World Bank 2012) . These investments should be coupled with investments in education, health, and social protection, which are equally critical for more balanced, inclusive and sustainable growth of the Chinese economy. Moreover, for a middle-income country like China to catch up 27 with the high-income countries, a higher level of investment, focusing on innovation and on absorbing more advanced technologies that already exist to lower the costs of development is important (Lin, 2012) . Improving income distribution through a more inclusive growth is an efficient way to increase consumption ratio. Delivering more, higher quality and better targeted social services to the underserved rural areas and migrant populations are among the key actions required to improve social and economic inequality (The World Bank, 2012) . Financial and corporate sector reforms are also important measures for boosting private consumption (IMF 2012d).
As a sustained recovery of global demand remains uncertain, in particular in the context of the ongoing euro area crisis, export demand weakens across all markets, as witnessed during 2012.
China's growth can continue to be fuelled mainly by higher domestic investment, including by subnational and local authorities, focusing on major infrastructure, including green projects, which represent important bottlenecks to growth at the regional and national levels. Private consumption, however, is likely to respond positively to the increased demand and real income.
However, in the medium-to long-term, expanding household income and consumption, mainly through expansion of the social protection programs, including health insurance and pension programs, is highly desirable for achievement of the "harmonious society." This change is likely to shift China's economic growth path towards a more balanced trajectory.
Concluding Remarks
China's government economic stimulus package in 2008-09 appears to have worked well. It seems to have been about the right size, included a number of appropriate components, and was well timed. Its subnational component was designed to enhance the impact of the stimulus package on the economy and reduce the potential procyclical elements that are usually built into subnational fiscal mechanisms in federal countries. Moreover, China's massive fiscal stimulus played an important role in the overall recovery of the global economy. Using a simple analytical framework, this paper focuses on two key factors behind the success of the stimulus: investments in bottleneck-easing infrastructure projects and countercyclical nature of subnational spending.
The well-chosen infrastructure investments not only could finance themselves in the long run, 28 through high economic rate of return, but in this case also helped improve business climate and crowded in the private investment and thereby enhanced productivity growth.
Moreover, the unusually expansionary subnational government spending played a key role in strengthening the overall impact of the stimulus and sustaining post crisis growth. The paper also highlights the importance of public investment quality and cautions about the sustainability of local government financing through the domestic banking system and possible increases in local governments off balance sheet or contingent liabilities. These lessons may be of particular relevance today for China, as well as other countries, in formulating policy response to another regional or global economic slowdown or crisis, possibly as a result of the Eurozone turmoil, to ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness of their fiscal interventions.
Finally, improving China's income distribution and inclusiveness of its economy, as well as reforming of its banking system and intergovernmental fiscal system, are critical for substantially stimulating private consumption and growth of domestic effective demand and thereby rebalancing GDP growth over the medium-to long-term.
